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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
COURT OF APPEALS 
The following issues are presented on this appeal. Each is accompanied by 
a citation to the record which demonstrates that the issue was preserved in the trial court. 
1. Did the district court err in allowing the prosecutor to depart from the bill 
of particulars, advancing alternative theories of who the defendant intended to defraud by 
means of the alleged forgery? R 821-22; 1148-49. Conclusions of law in criminal cases are 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). Cf. State v. 
Burnett 712 P.2d 260 (Utah 1985). 
2. Does the evidence support a theory that the defendant intended to defraud 
Nicole Packer? R 290-309, 312-13, 1035-38. The appellate court does not weigh the 
evidence in reviewing its sufficiency and will reverse only if the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable and the reasonable mind must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Utah 1993). 
3. Is there a legal nexus between the defendant's act and a specific intent to 
defraud anyone other than Nicole Packer? R 290-309, 312-13, 1035-38. See State v. 
Thurman, supra (conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness). 
4. Is the evidence sufficient to support a theory that the defendant intended 
to defraud someone other than Nicole Packer? R 290-309, 312-13, 1035-38. See State v. 
Workman, supra (verdict sustained unless the evidence is inconclusive or inherently 
improbable). 
5. Did the district court err in submitting the case to the jury on alternative 
theories without safeguards which would require the jury to reach unanimous agreement on 
FILED 
a theory of criminal responsibility? R 290-309, 312-13, 1148-49. See State v. Tillman. 750 
P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) (conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness). 
6. Can the verdict stand where it appears that the jury may have unanimously 
agreed on an invalid theory of criminal responsibility? R 290-309, 312-13, 1148-49. See 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) (conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness). 
7. Did the district court err in allowing the state's expert witness to testify that 
in his opinion the state's hypothetical question, which purportedly outlined the case against 
the defendant, presented "strong evidence of intent to defraud"? R 1117, 1143-44, 1150. 
Evidentiary rulings, including the admission of expert opinions, are reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
8. Did the district court err in admitting prejudicial material involving "other 
wrongs" allegedly committed by the defendant and by defendant's wife? R 191-94. See 
State v. Pena, supra (abuse of discretion standard applies). 
9. Did the district court err in refusing to give defendant's proposed jury 
instructions outlining the legal prerequisites to the creation of a joint venture and the nature 
of the relationship between co-venturers? R 1150-51. Rulings regarding instructions to the 
jury are reviewed for correctness granting no deference to the trial court. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992); State v. Peterson. 881 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1994). 
10. Did the district court err in defining "purpose to defraud" for the jury and 
in refusing to give a specific intent instruction? R 1151-52. See State v. Hamilton, supra 
(refusal of proposed jury instructions is reviewed for correctness). 
11. Did the district court err in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
regarding the alleged disqualification of the state's prosecutor and in denying the motion to 
disqualify out of hand? R 88-90, 131-32, 189-90. No Utah authority on standard of review. 
12. Did the district court err in ordering the defendant, a duly licensed 
attorney, to cease the practice of law as a condition of his probation? R 1201-06. See State 
v. Thurman, supra (conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness). 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
EMER KENT WINWARD, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 940530-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(f). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Forgery, a second degree felony, in violation 
of U.C.A. §76-6-501, and Unlawful Dealing with Property by Fiduciary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-513. After the defendant was bound over to answer 
these charges, the district court quashed that part of the information charging this 
defendant with Unlawful Dealing with Property by Fiduciary. 
Following his arraignment, defendant moved the district court to disqualify 
the state's prosecutor by reason of the prosecutor's misconduct. The court denied 
defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on the matter and denied the motion out 
1 
of hand. 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of Forgery, a second degree 
felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. The defendant was sentenced according to 
statute. The district court then stayed the execution of the sentence and placed the 
defendant on probation on certain terms and conditions which included a term of 
incarceration and an order that the defendant, a duly licensed attorney, not engage in 
the practice of law during the term of his probation. 
Defendant appeals the judgment and sentence, the order denying 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment, and the order denying defendant an evidentiary 
hearing on defendant's motion to disqualify Scott M. Burns as state's prosecutor in this 
matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by this appeal. Each is accompanied 
by a citation to the record which demonstrates that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court. 
1. Did the district court err in allowing the prosecutor to depart from the 
bill of particulars, advancing alternative theories of who the defendant intended to 
defraud by means of the alleged forgery? R 821-22,1148-49. This is a question of law. 
The ruling is reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court. See 
generally. State v. Spencer. 101 Utah 274,117 P.2d 455 (1941). Cf. State v. Burnett 712 
P.2d 260 (Utah 1985). 
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2. Does the evidence support a theory that the defendant intended to 
defraud Nicole Packer? R 290-309, 312-13, 1035-38. The appellate court does not 
weigh the evidence in reviewing its sufficiency and will reverse only if the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable and the reasonable mind must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt. State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Utah 1993). 
3. Is there a legal nexus between the defendant's act and a specific intent 
to defraud anyone other than Nicole Packer? R 290-309, 312-13, 1035-38. This is a 
question of law. The district court's conclusion is reviewed for correctness. See 
generally. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993). 
4. Is the evidence sufficient to support a theory that the defendant 
intended to defraud someone other than Nicole Packer? R 290-309, 312-13, 1035-38. 
A jury verdict will be sustained unless the evidence supporting it is inconclusive or 
inherently improbable. See State v. Workman, supra. 
5. Did the district court err in submitting the case to the jury on 
alternative theories without safeguards which would require the jury to reach unanimous 
agreement on a theory of criminal responsibility? R 290-309, 312-13, 1148-49. This is 
a question of law. The district court's conclusion is reviewed for correctness. See 
generally. State v. Deli, supra. Cf. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). 
6. Can the verdict stand where it appears that the jury may have 
unanimously agreed on an invalid theory of criminal responsibility? R 290-309, 312-13, 
1148-49. This is a question of law. The district court's conclusion is reviewed for 
correctness. See generally. State v. Deli, supra. Cf. State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150 
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(Utah 1991). 
7. Did the district court err in allowing the state's expert witness to testify 
that in his opinion the state's hypothetical question, which purportedly outlined the case 
against the defendant, presented "strong evidence of intent to defraud"? R 1117, 1143-
44, 1150. Evidentiary rulings, including the admission of expert opinions, are reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 
1993); See generally. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). 
8. Did the district court err in admitting prejudicial material involving 
"other wrongs" allegedly committed by the defendant and by defendant's wife? R 191-
94. An abuse of discretion standard applies to a review of this issue. See generally. 
State v. Pena, supra. 
9. Did the district court err in refusing to give defendant's proposed jury 
instructions outlining the legal prerequisites to the creation of a joint venture and the 
nature of the relationship between co-venturers? R 1150-51. Rulings regarding 
instructions to the jury are reviewed for correctness granting no deference to the trial 
court. State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1992); State v. Peterson. 881 P.2d 965 
(Utah App. 1994). 
10. Did the district court err in defining "purpose to defraud" for the jury 
and in refusing to give a specific intent instruction? R 1151-52. Rulings regarding jury 
instructions are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Hamilton, supra. 
11. Did the district court err in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
regarding the alleged disqualification of the state's prosecutor and in denying the motion 
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to disqualify out of hand? R 88-90, 131-32, 189-90. Counsel is unable to locate any 
Utah authority on the applicable standard of review. 
12. Did the district court err in ordering the defendant, a duly licensed 
attorney, to cease the practice of law as a condition of his probation? R 1201-06. The 
issue of whether or not the district court can discipline an attorney without complying 
with the provisions of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability is a question 
of law. The district court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. See generally. State v. 
Deli, supra. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The texts of the following authorities are set forth in the addendum: Utah 
Constitution, Art. I, §12 and Art. VIII, §4; Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501; and Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rules 403, 702, and 704. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In June 1993, defendant's wife invited her cousin, Linda Hess, to move to 
Cedar City and work as a nanny to the Winwards' daughters (R 921). Mrs. Winward 
permitted Hess to bring a friend by the name of Nicole Packer (R 921). Soon after the 
two young women moved in, Winwards developed a close personal relationship with 
Packer (R 946-47, 1056). 
Defendant's wife was associated with ERA Realty Center as a real estate 
sales person (R 856). Packer was looking for a job and Mrs. Winward hired her as a 
real estate assistant (R 921, 923, 946-47,1056). Mrs. Winward was relatively new to the 
5 
real estate business and she and Packer often discussed various methods of "prospecting" 
for new listings (R 957-58). Winwards and Packer began to discuss the possibility of 
purchasing real estate for cash, reselling it on terms at a profit, and equally dividing the 
profits (R 923-28, 950-51). 
George and Marie Bauer had listed a residential property for sale with 
Tom Goodman at ERA Realty Center on July 6, 1992. In listing the property, Bauers 
had indicated a willingness to accept a cash offer only (R 869). The asking price was 
$45,900 (R 857-58). After the property had been on the market for almost a year, 
Bauers executed a document modifying the listing agreement, extending the expiration 
date to December 6, 1993, and reducing the asking price to $43,900 (R 873). 
On July 12, 1993, Packer, in concert with Winwards (R 950-52, 1110), 
offered to purchase the Bauer property for $40,000 in cash (R 873-75; Exhibit No. 6). 
Winwards paid the $500 earnest money that was presented in connection with the offer 
(R 987, 997-98). The earnest money was paid by way of a check drawn on Mrs. 
Winward's account at Mountain America Credit Union (R 1060). Mrs. Winward 
presented Packer's offer to Tom Goodman, the listing agent (R 859). Goodman 
presented the offer to Bauers (R 874-75, 889). Bauer accepted the offer on July 14 (R 
875, 885; Exhibit 6). 
Winwards were acquainted with one Vicki Bassett. Kent Winward was 
Bassett's attorney and was representing her in a child custody contest (R 894). Bassett 
was living with her parents (R 893) and wanted to get into a home but could not find 
"anything" to rent (R 895, 906-07). Mrs. Bassett also testified that she did not have 
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money for a down payment or the credit necessary to purchase a home (R 896-99, 907). 
Bassett and her husband made an offer to buy the home from Packer on terms1 (R 
894, 902-03; Exhibit 10). 
Thereafter, Patricia B. Williams contacted defendant's wife regarding an 
unrelated transaction (R 1067). Williams was the holder of a trust deed note which was 
secured by some property that had been sold and was pending closing (R 1066). When 
that transaction closed Williams would receive more than $60,000 with the payoff of the 
note and wanted to reinvest this money (R 1067). Williams eventually agreed to 
purchase the note that Bassetts proposed to execute (R 1067). 
Although Packer understood that the venture contemplated the sale of her 
interest in the home (R 927, 951-53), she never involved herself in establishing the price 
at which she would sell the home (R 998-99) or even countersigned Bassetts' earnest 
money offer (R 999-1000). The defendant signed it on Packer's behalf (R 803-04,1071, 
1089). 
In summary, the transaction came together as follows: Bassett agreed to 
purchase the residence from Packer on terms which included the execution of a trust 
deed note in the amount of $55,000* (R 911-12). Packer assigned Bassett's $55,000 
trust deed note to Williams who purchased it at a substantial discount, paying $45,000 
for the note (R 814, 847-48, 969-71; Exhibit 20). Forty thousand dollars of this $45,000 
Ultimately, the home was conveyed to Mrs. Bassett individually because, according to Sally Melling of 
Cedar Land Title, Mr. Bassett "had liens against him" (R 816, 844, 903). 
^ e total sales price was $58,000. Instead of making the $3,000 down payment, Mrs. Bassett agreed to 
provide Winwards and Packer with $3,000 worth of cosmetic services (R 899-901, 912). 
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was paid to Bauers in fulfillment of Packer's agreement to pay Bauers in cash (R 983-
84). Everyone received everything that they were promised (R 881, 889-90, 916). 
Neither Bauers nor Packer were charged any loan discount points and neither Packer 
nor Bassett were charged a loan origination fee (R 807; Exhibit 11). All the transactions 
were closed at Cedar Land Title on August 6, 1993 (R 814-15). 
The title company issued a check in the amount of $4,697.50 representing 
the gross profit generated through the sale to Bassett.3 The check was made payable 
to Packer's order (R 816-17; Exhibit 1). On August 9, the defendant picked the check 
up, (R 817) endorsed Packer's name on it (R 941-42, 1079), and deposited it into Mrs. 
Winward's account at Mountain America Credit Union (R 1079-80; Exhibits 1, 2 and 
3). Winwards then issued Packer a check in the amount of $1,160 from Mrs. Winward's 
account at Mountain America (R 994, 1080-81). One thousand dollars of that check 
represented compensation for Packer's participation in the venture (R 994). Packer 
never expressly authorized defendant to endorse her name to the check from the title 
company (R 942). 
In September 1993, Packer and defendant's wife had a serious falling out 
in which Mrs. Winward accused Ms. Packer of padding her hours (R 1014). Ms. 
Packer's employment for Mrs. Winward was terminated. 
In October 1993, Packer was lead to believe that there had been an 
$18,000 profit in the Packer/Bassett transaction (R 937-38, 962-65, 995-96). After 
Out-of-pocket expenses, including the earnest money advanced by Winwards, have not been deducted 
from this figure (R 837-38, 987,1075-76). 
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conducting her own investigation, Packer swore out a forgery affidavit on January 3, 
1994 (Exhibit 4). Thereafter, Mountain America Credit Union froze Mrs. Winward's 
account, removing approximately $2,800 therefrom in order to partially cover the 
$4,697.50 that the credit union had been required to pay back to the drawee bank (R 
780-81, 785-86). 
On January 14, 1994, the defendant was charged with Forgery, a second 
degree felony (R 1-5). He was convicted by a jury verdict on July 27, 1994 (R 254) and 
was sentenced to a term of 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison (R 362-66). The 
execution of that sentence was stayed and the defendant was placed on 36-months 
probation on certain terms and conditions which included incarceration in the Iron 
County Jail for a term of 90 days and the payment of a fine and surcharge totaling 
$1,850.00 (R 362-66). 
Although the presentence report recommended that the defendant be 
ordered to pay Packer restitution, the district court concluded that Packer was not 
entitled to restitution but ordered that a restitution hearing be held in the future to 
determine whether or not Mountain America Credit Union had suffered any loss by 
reason of the alleged forgery (R 1258-59). 
Finally, the district court included as a term of defendant's probation an 
order that he not engage in the practice of law for a period of 36 months (R 363). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in allowing the prosecution to depart from the bill 
of particulars, advancing alternative theories of who the defendant intended to defraud 
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by means of the alleged forgery. The district court ultimately concluded that some of 
these theories lacked evidentiary support but nevertheless submitted the case to the jury 
on all of the theories without any safeguard that would make certain the jury 
unanimously agreed on a viable theory of criminal responsibility. 
The theory that defendant intended to defraud Nicole Packer is the only 
theory in which there is a legal nexus between the "unauthorized" endorsement and any 
fraudulent intent and this theory is not supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even if the state's case were otherwise viable, defendant was prejudiced 
by the admission of "rebuttal" testimony in which the state's "expert" was allowed to 
express his opinion regarding the strength of the state's evidence. Defendant was 
further prejudiced by the introduction of evidence of other "wrongs" which had no 
relationship to the forgery charge. 
The district court further erred in refusing to instruct the jury on principles 
of law relating to the creation of a joint venture, implied authority among co-venturers, 
and specific intent. The evidence supported instructions on all of these issues and they 
were central to the defendant's theory of defense. 
Defendant contends that the district court erred in refusing to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to disqualify the state's prosecutor for 
misconduct and further erred in denying the motion. 
Finally, defendant contends that even if the conviction is upheld, the 
district court erred in prohibiting the defendant, a duly licensed attorney, from engaging 
in the practice of law as a condition of his probation. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
PROSECUTION TO DEPART FROM THE BILL OF 
PARTICULARS. 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to demand "the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him". Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. The 
defendant demanded and the state provided a bill of particulars. 
In relevant part, the motion for bill of particulars read: 
[RJequest is made for the production of the following information 
within ten (10) days: 
3. With respect to Count III:4 
a. The identity of the person and/or entity that Defendant 
Emer Kent Winward sought to defraud; and 
b. The nature and identity of the fraud which said 
defendant was facilitating. 
R 17-18. 
The corresponding reply in the bill stated: 
RESPONSE 3: With respect to Count III; 
(a) The identity of the person that Defendant EMER 
KENT WINWARD sought to defraud is Nicole Packer. 
(b) The nature and identity of the fraud that Defendant was 
facilitating was taking a check made payable to Nicole Packer, 
forging her name without her knowledge, and depositing the 
monies in his wife's account so he and his wife, not Ms. Packer, 
could use and spend the monies. Specifically, the State alleges that 
the act occurred without her authority and that the Defendant not 
"The original information charged both defendant and his wife with Unlawful Dealing with Property by 
Fiduciary and Forgery. Count III was the forgery charge against this defendant and the only charge this 
defendant was ultimately required to answer. 
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only forged her signature but took substantial steps in trying to 
obtain the actual monies after the check was deposited. 
R 26. 
Defendant first became aware that the field of alleged victims included 
persons and entities other than Nicole Packer when the district court itself began asking 
questions directed to the issue of whether or not Mountain America Credit Union had 
suffered any loss (R 785-86). Defendant's objection to the court's questions was argued 
off the record at the bench (R 786) and the following record was made later after the 
jury was excused for the noon recess. 
MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, when the Court began that line 
of inquiry, I felt that it was irrelevant and immaterial and I felt 
that it was particularly irrelevant and immaterial in light of the 
State's response to my request for bill of particulars. The reason 
that I think that it had potential for prejudice in this case is 
because the Court has now ruled that it is admissible, competent 
evidence. I would assume that that means that it is admissible, 
competent evidence for whatever Mr. Burns wants to argue that it 
means. And because of that, I see potential for prejudice, because 
Mr. Burns can now argue to the jury that even if Mr. Winward — 
and if he's going to be able to depart — let me back up — if he's 
going to be able to depart from his bill of particulars, then he'll be 
able to stand up in front of that jury and based upon the admission 
of that evidence, he'll be able to argue to that jury that Mr. 
Winward, even if he didn't intent to defraud Nicole Packer, he 
should have known that Nicole Packer may very well go down and 
sign a forgery affidavit and that that may prejudice the bank and 
that indeed through the Court's questioning it may have appeared 
that there was some prejudice to the credit union because the 
check was for $4,600.00 and Nicole Packer had already received a 
substantial amount of that and there was only $2,800.00, according 
to Miss Stucki, still in the account. For those reasons, I see 
potential for prejudice there and accordingly I move the Court for 
a mistrial. 
R 821-22. 
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MR. PENDLETON: The specific request for a particular number 
three, was asking the Court - or the prosecution to identify with 
particularity the person which they claimed had been defrauded or 
sought — that the defendant sought to defraud. 
MR. BURNS: But the question doesn't say, Your Honor - and 
also the State set forth all persons with whom the defendant had 
"a purpose to defraud" or acted 'Svith knowledge that he was 
facilitating a fraud11 against. That response was made by the State 
in answer to a question that Mr. Pendleton submitted regarding 
who's the victim in the state's mind of the forged check. 
THE COURT: All right. Counsel--
MR. BURNS: You can't ask question A and ask that the State 
respond to X, Y and Z. 
THE COURT: Counsel, here's the question. "With respect to 
Count III," which was the forgery count at the existing Information 
at that time, "it is requested (a) the identity of the person and/or 
entity the defendant Emer Kent Winward sought to defraud and 
the nature and the identity of the fraud said defendant was 
facilitating." Now, Nicole Packer is one of a list and apparently it's 
the State's theory that that's who Mr. Winward sought to defraud -
MR. BURNS: Correct. 
THE COURT: - but he may have, in fact, defrauded others along 
the way. 
MR. BURNS: Correct. 
THE COURT: That's the record. We'll stand in recess for an 
hour from now. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
R 824-25. 
Ultimately, Packer, Bauers, Bassetts, ERA Realty Center, and Mountain 
America Credit Union would be included in what the district court would later refer to 
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as !,that universe of victims" (R 1270) and the district court would conclude that the state 
was not required to identify a victim at any point in the prosecution. 
THE COURT: . . . . Now, this is the part that I want to place 
clearly on the record, Mr. Pendleton, because this is the Court's 
ruling based upon this understanding of the statute, and if I am in 
error, my guess is this is where it is. I don't think I am or I 
wouldn't rule this way. But the legislature in defining forgery and 
placing it under the fraud subpart of 76, Chapter 6, defined forgery 
as if flwith a purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he 
is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone," then alters or 
makes, utters, etc., all that language. To me that says that the 
legislature as well as the drafting entity that gave us the uniform -
- the model penal code from which this statute comes, conceived 
of a broader classification of victim rather than the payee of a 
forged check, conceived of a broader classification of a victim than 
even the banking institutions that may deal with that check in the 
ordinary course of business, institutions that otherwise would be 
holders in due course save and except a forged endorsement. By 
using the term "anyone" broadly, and I'll cite to the record in and 
for the benefit of both counsel, 76-1-104, "Purposes and Principles 
of Construction," and 76-1-106, "Strict Construction Rule not 
Applicable." I look at both of those and find a clear legislative 
intent to broaden the spectrum of the consequences of endorsing 
a check with someone else's name without authority where there 
is a potential and an - not a potential - an intent or knowledge 
that facilitation of a fraud on anyone be taken. 
Based upon that, I find there's a prima facie case. Motion to 
dismiss is overruled. 
R 1044-45. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'm not sure that the State's even 
advancing a theory. I think they're still talking about Vicki Bassett 
or not Vicki Bassett, Nicole Packer, and that's frankly the first and 
foremost one that they get. But the legislature in drafting it the 
way they did gave a much broader - broader, much broader 
response. And I'm not sure that the State is bound to that 
particular bill of particulars because it's still their primary theory. 
R 1050. 
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When the district court instructed the jury, the elements instruction failed 
to indicate that the jury would be required to conclude that the defendant had intended 
to defraud any particular person or entity.5 The defendant objected: 
MR. PENDLETON Now, with this instruction, the State -
the Court is allowing the government to argue purpose to defraud 
as it may relate to Bauers, Bassetts, the credit union, ERA Realty, 
and anybody else in this world and I'm not sure who that may or 
may not be, but I'm sure I'll find out during closing argument. 
R 1148. 
In arguing the case to the jury, the state's prosecutor claimed that Bauers 
(R 1168), Packer (R 1168-69), and Vicki Bassett (R 1169-1170) were all victims of the 
alleged forgery.6 
In State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 (Utah 1985), the defendant operated a 
5Instruction No. 14-A used the statutory language stating that the jury must determine whether the 
defendant "acted with a purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone" (R 243). The defendant's proposed elements instruction would have required the jury 
to determine whether the defendant acted "with the specific intent of defrauding Nicole Packer" (R 230). 
Ironically, the district court concluded that the evidence would not support a claim that Bauers or ERA 
had been viaims of the alleged forgery. See discussion at pages 25 through 27, infra. Furthermore, in denying 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment, the district court concluded that Mountain America Credit Union was 
the victim of the offense. 
[THE COURT] The agency recommendation recommends that restitution in the 
amount of $3,097.00 be paid to Nicole Packer, whom the report characterizes as the 
victim. This Court has heard the evidence and specifically finds that Nicole Packer 
is not a victim. In all likelihood, Nicole Packer, who strikes this Court as being an 
extremely bright young woman, was a co-participant in these activities and to 
characterize her as a victim and a recipient of restitution is unreasonable. 
Restitution will be ordered at a time, later to be determined, but the Court 
specifically fixes the victim as Mountain America Credit Union. Mountain America 
Credit Union is the holder of this instrument which has been dishonored. Mountain 
America Credit Union, as I recall from the testimony at trial, recovered from the 
accounts a certain portion of the $4,600.00, but there is a balance due that needs to 
be fixed. 
R 1258-59. 
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business known as American Pension Services ("APS"). APS controlled and managed 
individual retirement accounts for third-party investors. Initially, defendant operated 
APS as his sole proprietorship and later as a partnership with one Curtis DeYoung. 
When he was charged with eight counts of theft from APS, defendant defended on the 
basis that it was legally impossible for him to exercise unauthorized control over either 
his own property or partnership property. In denying Burnett's motion for a judgment 
of acquittal, the trial court concluded that there was no significant difference between 
theft from APS and theft of third-party funds controlled by APS. Burnett moved for a 
mistrial, which motion was denied. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court cited Article 
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and State v. Mvers. 5 Utah 2d 365, 302 P.2d 276 
(1956) (bill of particulars circumscribes the scope of the evidence which the state may 
present). In unanimously reversing the conviction, the court held: 
In this case, Burnett's entire defense rested on the theory that he 
could not be convicted of exercising unauthorized control over the 
property of APS because a sole proprietor is authorized to control 
his own property and a partner can control partnership property. 
Burnett's counsel was not on notice that the charge was theft from 
a pool of investors and his defense was not structured to meet that 
charge. Because the variance clearly prejudiced him in the 
preparation and conduct of his defense on the merits, the 
conviction must be reversed. 
Id. at 262. 
In the instant case, the defendant was prepared to defend against the 
allegation that he had intended to defraud Nicole Packer. Indeed, his entire defense 
was centered around the co-venturer relationship he had with Packer, the discussions 
they had had, and the agreements they had reached. He was not prepared to defend 
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against the entire world: to counter every superficial theory of criminal responsibility-
the state could devise or answer allegations of wrongdoing completely unrelated to the 
accusation that he endorsed the subject check with the intent of defrauding Nicole 
Packer. Once it became apparent that the state would not be bound by the bill of 
particulars, the defendant moved immediately for a mistrial (R 822). 
The defendant was not informed of the nature of the accusation against 
him. The right to be so informed is constitutional in dimension. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION. 
A 
PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD PACKER 
Up until trial, the state's theory was that Packer had been cheated out of 
her share of the profits derived from her venture with Winwards (R 26). Accordingly, 
we deal first with that theory of "purpose to defraud". 
Defendant concedes that the specific intent to defraud is not often 
susceptible to direct proof and can usually only be established by the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. Furthermore, one fact giving rise to a permissible inference of intent 
to defraud may indeed be an accused's unauthorized endorsement of a negotiable 
instrument. However, under the circumstances of this case, the subject endorsement 
does not give rise to any presumption or inference of an intent to defraud. 
Where the facts and circumstances surrounding the endorsement of a 
check are compatible with the advancement of a legitimate objective, the fact of the 
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unauthorized endorsement will not support an inference of an intent to defraud. See 
People v. Valdes. 318 P.2d 118 (Cal. 1957). 
In Valdes. the defendant was engaged in the business of arranging loans, 
preparing documentation, and dealing in real estate. One Garcia approached the 
defendant for the purpose of obtaining a loan to purchase a television set. The 
defendant prepared the application and loan documents and presented them to his 
business associate who approved the loan, issued a check payable to Garcia, and 
delivered it to the defendant. The defendant endorsed Garcia's name on the check and 
cashed it. Meanwhile, Garcia decided not to purchase the television set and refused to 
accept a tender of the proceeds of the check, insisting on a cancellation of the loan 
transaction. Garcia would later testify that he had never authorized the defendant to 
endorse his name on the subject check. 
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed, claiming that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish the offense of forgery. In reversing the conviction, 
the California Court of Appeals held that under the circumstances, the evidence would 
not support an inference that the defendant knew that his endorsement of the check was 
unauthorized and further concluded that the evidence would not support an inference 
of any intent to defraud. 
The evidence in the instant case clearly demonstrates that Packer was 
participating with Winwards in a venture under circumstances where she relied upon 
them to handle virtually every aspect of the transaction (R 998-99). Furthermore, the 
defendant signed the earnest money agreement on Packer's behalf and Packer ratified 
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the transaction and participated in the closing. Under these circumstances, the 
endorsement of Packer's name and the deposit of the check into the account from which 
the earnest money had been paid and from which Packer would immediately be paid 
will not support an inference of any intent to defraud Packer.7 Furthermore, given the 
relationship among the parties to this venture, it appears that to the extent the 
defendant endorsed the check for the purpose of advancing the business of the joint 
venture, he was arguably acting within the scope of his implied authority. See Point 
V(A), infra. Accordingly, we will now review the direct evidence of intent to defraud. 
Packer and the defendant both testified that when they first discussed the 
proposed venture they were each to receive one third of the net profit (R 925,1061-62). 
The state is determined to overlook the fact that Winwards had advanced the earnest 
money and miscellaneous expenses which they were entitled to recover before the net 
profit was divided (R 986-87, 1074-76).8 But, more importantly, what the state prefers 
to disregard is the fact that Packer acknowledged that she f,must have11 had a 
conversation with the defendant and his wife wherein she was promised the sum of 
$1,000 in connection with her participation in the transaction (R 991-95,1009).9 When 
•7 
Not only was this same checking account used to facilitate the joint venture's business, Packer herself 
had access to the account (R 1005-06). 
^Tiese expenses included wages Mrs. Winward paid Packer for the time she spent working on the 
Bauer/Packer transaction and the Packer/Bassett transaction (R 986). 
9
 Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] Okay. After Pat Williams had agreed to buy this note and after 
Vicki Bassett and Dan Bassett had agreed on the purchase price, did you have discussions 
with Mr. and Mrs. Winward in their kitchen at their residence where you and they and Linda 
Hess were present about what the projected profit of this transaction was going to be? 
A. [BY MS. PACKER] I don't know if we had the discussion in their kitchen with Linda 
present, but we had several discussions about what the projected profit would be, as I testified 
to before. 
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she received $1,000 she expected no more and in fact has never asserted any claim 
against the defendant for any additional part of the profits realized in the transaction 
(R 990-91, 995). In fact, even at the time of trial, Packer would not presume to state 
how much Winwards still owed her for her participation in the venture or even claim 
that they owed her anything (R 988-90, 1017). 
The defendant testified that before the parties knew what their out-of-
pocket expenses and closing costs would be, Winwards and Packer discussed the 
transaction and agreed that Packer would receive $1,000 (R 1069-74). The defendant 
testified unequivocally that Packer was promised and agreed to accept $1,000 as her 
share of the profits of this transaction (R 1074). Packer never denied this fact when she 
testified during the state's case in chief and she was not called as a rebuttal witness. 
There is no evidence indicating that Packer had been told that $1,000 
Q. And what did you project those profits at during those discussions? 
A. It varied and I can't tell you what the projection would have been for one specific 
conversation. It was over a year ago and I simply don't remember. 
Q. Okay. 
A. It wasn't important to me because I figured that when the closing date came, I would just 
get one-third, whatever that was, and I didn't worry about it. 
Q. Did you have a discussion where — before the closing costs were known and all of the 
expenses of the transaction were known, with Mr. and Mrs. Winward wherein you discussed 
receiving $1,000.00 for compensation in connection with your participation in this venture? 
A I don't specifically recall the conversation, but I'm sure that we had one because when I 
received the $1,000.00 check, it was no shock to me. I knew -
Q. You knew — 
A - I knew - by the time we had closed the transaction, I knew that I was going to receive 
a thousand dollars. 
Q. Okay. And you knew that because of an agreement and discussion that you had had with 
Mr. and Mrs. Winward before all of the figures were even known to them, isn't that correct? 
A-1 don't know if that's correct or not. 
Q. Well, search -
A. I don't know when the conversation would have taken place. I do know that when I got 
the check it wasn't a surprise to me, so I must have known at some previous point. I do not 
now when that was. 
R 990-92. 
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would be, or was, one-third of the net profit. Indeed, there is no evidence that the 
defendant knew what the net profit would be when he and his wife promised Packer 
that she would receive $1,000. 
Packer admitted that she "figured" that there would only be one check 
from the title company, that that check would contain all the profits from the transaction 
which were to be divided among her and Winwards and that the check would be payable 
to her (R 1010-11). Packer received payment by means of a check drawn on Mrs. 
Winward's account. She allowed months to pass before she ever challenged the 
endorsement of the check — a check she must have known existed ~ and then only after 
the termination of her employment with Mrs. Winward and after she had been lead to 
believe that the profit from the Packer/Bassett transaction had been $18,000. 
Reasonable minds could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there was any purpose to defraud Packer. 
B 
PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD OTHERS. 
Nexus Between Act and Specific Intent 
In every crime there must be a joint operation of act and intent. 
Furthermore, there must be a legal nexus between the defendant's mental state and the 
act or omission. 
In denying defendant's motion for acquittal, the district court attempted 
to identify such a nexus. The district court concluded that the jury could find the 
defendant guilty if it found that defendant had intended to defraud anyone and that the 
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subject endorsement was used to conceal the fraud either before or after the fact. The 
district court opined that in any fraud it is important to "compartmentalize11 the 
information to make sure that those who are being defrauded do not share information 
which would allow them to discover the fraud (R 1047-48). As it evolved at trial, the 
state's theory was that the subject endorsement may have enabled the defendant to keep 
Packer, Bauers, Bassetts, and ERA Realty Center from sharing information related to 
the real estate transactions. 
The crime of forgery developed as a means of reaching and punishing the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of fraud by inducing another to rely on a false 
writing. It is the nexus between the nature of the writing and the character of the fraud 
that provides logical support for grading the seriousness of offense based upon the type 
of writing involved.10 
The elements of fraud are clearly established in this jurisdiction. See Pace 
v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). These elements include a knowing 
misrepresentation, a purpose of inducing another party to act upon the 
misrepresentation, and the other party's detrimental reliance upon the 
misrepresentation. Id. at 144-45. In the crime of forgery, the false writing is the 
misrepresentation. 
The jurisdictions, which have a statutory definition of "intent to defraud," 
As an example, while shopping, H discovers that he has forgotten his checkbook and has mistakenly 
brought a checkbook belonging to W, his wife. H is not authorized to sign on Ws account H proceeds to 
the checkout stand intending to make the purchase by signing Ws name to a check, confident that W will 
ratify the act. In ringing up the purchases, the cashier mistakenly charges H $4 for an item which costs $6. 
H notices the error but says nothing. H completes the purchase, signing Ws name to the check. Is this wrong 
punishable as a felony forgery? 
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as that phrase is applied to the law of forgery, have incorporated the common law 
elements of fraud. For example, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3110(9) states: 
"Intent to defraud1' means an intention to deceive another person, 
and to induce such other person, in reliance upon such deception, 
to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or 
power with reference to property. 
The Utah statute does not define "purpose to defraud". However, some 
light can be shed on the scope of this phrase by considering the language which the 
Utah legislature deleted in adopting the Model Penal Code. The model code uses the 
phrase "purpose to defraud or injure". Model Penal Code §224.1. According to the 
commentators, the words "or injure" were included in the order to indicate an intention 
to expand the traditional scope of the offense of forgery. Model Penal Code §224.1, 
comment 5(a). Utah's election to delete these words is incompatible with such an 
intention. Under the Utah statute, the requisite specific intent retains the traditional 
elements of fraud. 
In the instant case, the district court completely dispensed with the 
requirement that the unauthorized endorsement be made with the intention of inducing 
another person to act in reliance thereon. The district court relied on State v. Gonzalez, 
822 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1991), where it was stated: 
Utah courts have yet to define the term "purpose to defraud." But 
the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "'intent to defraud'... is 
simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were genuine in 
order to gain some advantage[.]" State v. May, 93 Idaho 343, 461 
P.2d 126, 128 (1969)(citations omitted). That court went on to 
state that "a false writing has such an obvious tendency to 
accomplish fraud that the jury is warranted in inferring such an 
intent from the mere creation of an instrument that is false." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
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822 P.2d at 1216. 
The above-quoted language appears in the court's discussion of the 
sufficiency of the evidence and not in the context of approving a jury instruction which 
had defined "purpose to defraud". The question of whether the necessary legal nexus 
has been established is a question of law. Generally, there is no necessity of instructing 
the jury in such a manner as to assist the jury in detemiining whether the legal nexus 
has been established. See State v. Rios, infra. 
In both Gonzalez and May, the false instruments were in fact presented 
to intended victims for the purpose of inducing them to rely upon the instrument. In 
Gonzalez, a forged check in the amount of $300 was tendered to Smiths Food and Drug 
Center in payment for $268.28 in merchandise. In May, the victim loaned the defendant 
$4,000 in reliance upon a forged promissory note. Neither one of these cases stands for 
the proposition that the well-established elements of fraud are no longer a part of the 
public offense of forgery. Indeed, both opinions refer to a false instrument's "obvious 
tendency to accomplish fraud." This is clearly an allusion to the use of such instruments 
to induce detrimental reliance. 
There is no legal nexus between the allegedly unauthorized endorsement 
and a "purpose to defraud" Bauers, Bassetts, or ERA Realty Center. This is not to say 
that the person who is defrauded must be the person who is induced to rely on the false 
instrument. However, the fraud, regardless of who is victimized, must be facilitated by 
inducing or intending to induce someone to rely on the false writing. 
In State v. Rios. 246 Kan. 517, 792 P.2d 1065 (1990), the defendant 
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worked as a store manager for a retail merchandiser. He used his employer's refund 
vouchers for the purpose of concealing his embezzlement of company funds. This was 
accomplished by signing customers' names on vouchers in order to make it appear that 
customers had obtained cash refunds for returning merchandise. The defendant placed 
the vouchers in the safe and removed the money. The vouchers made the books 
balance for accounting purposes. In reversing the conviction for making a false 
writing,11 a unanimous court held: 
Defendants did not obtain the money represented on each voucher 
because of the voucher. Dillard's was not induced and was not 
intended to be induced to part with the money shown on the 
voucher by presentation of the voucher. Dillard's had been 
deprived of the money shown on the voucher before the voucher 
was processed by Dillard's. Each voucher was created for and 
used to cover up the theft of the money shown on its face. Intent 
to defraud requires that the maker of the instrument intended to 
deceive another person and to induce such person, in reliance 
upon the deception, to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate 
a right, obligation, or power with reference to property. The 
evidence herein does not satisfy this element. 
It may be argued that the cover-up of each theft by means of a 
voucher allowed each such theft to remain undiscovered and 
hence, permitted the defendants to remain in the employ of 
Dillard's with the opportunity to commit new thefts. However, the 
statutory definition of intent to defraud is not broad enough to 
include the facts herein. 
Id. at 1074. 
In the instant case, a much broader definition of "purpose to defraud" can 
be applied and still exclude the 'Svrongs" allegedly inflicted upon Bauers, Bassetts, and 
The Kansas court noted that the nature of the false instrument which was the subject of the prosecution 
in Rios would indicate that the offense should have been charged under the forgery statute. Id. at 1073-74. 
The court further noted that, if the offense had been charged as a forgery, proof of the same specific intent 
to defraud would have still been required. Id. at 1074. 
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ERA Realty Center. The wrong inflicted by the defendant in Rios was a felony theft 
and, according to the Kansas Supreme Court, should have been charged as such. See 
id. at 1075. Furthermore, Rios' purpose in using the bogus vouchers to conceal his 
embezzlement was real and apparent. By contrast, the tlwrongs!! allegedly inflicted upon 
Bauers, Bassetts and ERA do not even give rise to civil causes against this defendant. 
The after-the-fact endorsement of the subject check does not convert these 'Wongs11 into 
felonious fraud. Furthermore, the argument that the defendant endorsed the subject 
check to conceal the wrongs he had allegedly inflicted upon Bauers, Bassetts and ERA 
was an illusion - a feeble attempt to establish a nexus between the endorsement and 
these alleged "wrongs".12 
Counsel has not located a single authority in which a forgery conviction 
has been sustained on the basis of a fraud which was perpetrated independent of the 
false writing. There is no legal nexus between the endorsement and an intent to defraud 
Bauers, Bassets, or ERA. 
Insufficiency of Evidence of Fraud Perpetrated Against Bauers, Bassetts, ERA Realty 
Center, or Mountain America Credit Union. 
Assuming arguendo that there is a sufficient legal nexus between an intent 
to defraud Bauers, Bassetts, or ERA and the endorsement of the subject check, the 
Sally Melting of Cedar Land Title testified that the Packer/Bassett closing statement was completely 
filled out when Packer and Bassett executed it (R 843). Bassett never denied this. Although Packer claimed 
that the documents had not been filled out prior to the time she signed (R 961), the very nature of the overall 
transaction contemplated ongoing contact between Bassett and Packer in connection with services that Bassett 
would render as her down payment There is no evidentiary support for the theory that the defendant 
endorsed the subject check in order to prevent Packer from sharing information with the "victims". Indeed, 
Packer testified that she and Mrs. Bassett attended the closing at the same time (R 966). 
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evidence does not support any claim that a fraud was perpetrated or attempted against 
any one of these alleged victims or Mountain America Credit Union. 
ERA Realty Center. There was no evidence indicating that ERA had any legally 
enforceable interest in the Packer/Bassett transaction (R 869-70) nor has ERA made 
a claim to any commission arising out of that transaction (R 839, 849). The state failed 
to establish a prima facie case of a "purpose to defraud" this alleged victim. The district 
court finally conceded this point during argument on defendant's motion for judgment 
of acquittal. 
[MR. PENDLETON] [T]he case is so full of other allegations of 
intent to defraud, none of which can be tied — can be shown to 
have been facilitated by this check. Any alleged fraud on Bauers, 
how was that facilitated by this check? It wasn't. Any alleged 
fraud on ERA because they supposedly didn't get — they were 
supposedly entitled to a real estate transaction on the second 
closing, how was that facilitated by that check? 
THE COURT: I can't see that one, Counsel. There was never a 
listing agreement, so don't worry about ERA at all. 
R 1042. 
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, will I at some point have a chance to 
argue the - what the State believes facilitation or purpose to 
defraud ERA and the Bauers as well prior to submission, 
obviously, of instructions and final argument? 
THE COURT: Certainly, Counsel. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure where we're going to go with that. 
I - I'll give you the benefit of my thought now to see if you can 
either find some evidence or some reasoning. I don't see any tie 
so far in our case in chief putting Mr. Winward close enough to 
the Bauers or putting Mr. Winward close enough to ERA 
Frankly, without a listing agreement, I can't see where civilly ERA 
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is entitled to a commission at all. ERA's name may have been 
used without authority, but -
MR. BURNS: 111 argue it, Your Honor, but I appreciate that. 
R 1045-46. 
Bauers. There was no evidence of any misrepresentation of any material fact made by 
this defendant or anyone else to Bauers concerning Packer's offer to purchase the 
property. Indeed, Bauers received everything that they were promised in connection 
with the sale to Packer (R 875, 881, 889-90). Furthermore, there was no evidence of 
any relationship between this defendant and Bauers which imposed upon this defendant 
any duty to disclose to Bauers his interest in the transaction (R 880-81, 890). Bauers 
possess no legal claim against this defendant by reason of the Bauer/Packer transaction. 
The evidence does not establish a prima facie case of fraud perpetrated against Bauers. 
The district court expressly conceded this point during argument on defendant's motion 
to arrest judgment. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let me clarify one thing. Having listened 
to the preliminary hearing and after listening to the trial, I see no 
conceivable way that the jury verdict could have relied upon the 
victimization of the Bauers. I see no connection, no factual 
content there, so take the Bauers out of your concern. I see no 
concern there with Mr. Winward and the Bauers. There was no 
evidence whatsoever showing any connection there, so we can 
eliminate that from your concern. 
R 1238. 
Bassetts. Mrs. Bassett testified that she knew Packer prior to the Packer/Bassett 
transaction (R 897). She was aware of the relationship between Packer and Winwards 
(R 897, 908). She knew that Packer was purchasing the subject property from a third 
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party (R 908-09) but never inquired as to the price or terms of that transaction (R 909). 
She was advised of the fact that Winwards were attempting to locate someone who 
would buy a promissory note which Bassetts would execute in connection with their 
proposed purchase of the property on terms (R 912, 915). 
There was no evidence that the transaction between Packer and Bassetts 
was unfair to Bassetts. The fair market value of the subject property has never been 
established by appraisal (R 873, 910). Bassetts were purchasing the property on terms 
and were not even required to make a cash down payment (R 907-08). Bassetts were 
allowed to take possession of the home under an obligation to make monthly payments 
on the promissory note which were approximately equal to the fair rental value of the 
property (R 906-07). 
Even if the defendant is guilty of a breach of ethics with respect to Vicki 
Bassett, such a breach would not, in and of itself, constitute fraud. The evidence fails 
to establish a single material misrepresentation made by the defendant to the Bassetts 
and indeed Bassetts received everything that they were promised under the terms of the 
Packer/Bassett transaction (R 916). The state failed to establish a prima facie case of 
fraud perpetrated against Bassetts. 
Mountain America Credit Union. The district court concluded that Mountain America 
Credit Union had been victimized by the alleged forgery. It is unclear whether the 
district court meant that it had concluded that Mountain America had simply suffered 
a loss as the result of the alleged forgery or had concluded that there was evidence from 
which the jury could have concluded that the defendant intended to defraud Mountain 
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America. We here review the sufficiency of the evidence of an intent to defraud the 
credit union. 
In denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court 
commented: 
I look at both of these and find a clear legislative intent to 
broaden the spectrum of the consequences of endorsing a check 
with someone else's name without authority where there is a 
potential and an ~ not a potential - an intent or knowledge that 
facilitation of fraud on anyone be taken. 
R 1045. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence at best demonstrates nothing 
more than a potential for loss to Mountain America. Under the facts of this case, an 
intent to defraud Mountain America could not exist independent of an intent to defraud 
Nicole Packer.13 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE 
CASE TO THE JURY ON ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT SAFEGUARD TO 
INSURE UNANIMITY ON A VALID THEORY. 
A 
JURY UNANIMITY RE: NATURE OF FRAUD 
Even if each and every one of the above-mentioned theories of liability 
13Mountain America could have been the intended victim of the alleged forgery even if there was no 
intent to defraud Packer if Packer and Winward conspired to defraud the credit union, i.e., if Packer and 
Winward had agreed that Winward would endorse the check and that they would divide the proceeds and that 
Packer would then disavow the endorsement after the funds had been placed beyond Mountain America's 
ability to recover them. Cf. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1979). There is no evidence of such a 
conspiracy in the instant case. 
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was viable, the verdict nevertheless cannot stand because there was no safeguard in the 
manner in which the jury was instructed to insure that the jurors unanimously agreed 
on who the victim or what the fraud was. 
Defendant is aware of State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), where 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a second-degree murder conviction although the trial 
court had refused to instruct the jury that there must be unanimous agreement on which 
of three alternative mens rea the defendant possessed, i.e., intent to kill, intent to cause 
serious bodily injury, or "depraved indifference". In the instant case, we are concerned 
with a single specific intent - the purpose to defraud. If the jury is allowed to disagree 
on what fraud the defendant intended to commit, they are not disagreeing on which 
alternate mens rea the defendant possessed. 
The rule set out in Russell has application only where a statute provides 
various modes by which a specific offense may be committed. See generally. 
Annotation: Jury Unanimity-Mode of Offense, 75 A.L.R.4th 91. It does not apply 
where the prosecution relies on alternative t!wrongstf to prove a single offense or a single 
element of an offense. See Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1991); Covington 
v. State, 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1985). 
Consider Justice Stewart's observations in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 
(Utah 1987), 585-88 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting), id. at 591 (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 577-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result): 
The importance of preserving the principle of jury 
unanimity as to all "elements of an offense" can hardly be 
overstated. To dilute that principle by allowing jurors to disagree 
among themselves as to separate, alternative elements of the 
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crime, even though they agree on the general conclusion that the 
crime . . . has in fact been committed, is to lose the value of the 
synergistic effect of jurors acting as a group in reconstructing the 
facts and applying the law. Nonunanimity permits a jury to refrain 
from coming to grips with determining precisely what the 
defendant did and then deciding whether that meets the legal 
standards that define the elements of the crime. 
Nonunanimity as to alternative elements of a crime can also 
deprive a defendant of a defense to the charge. [I]f a defendant 
urges a defense that is valid as to one alternative element but not 
to another and the jury splits on which alternative the defendant 
committed, the jury is not forced to decide the validity of the 
defense. 
Finally, if the principle of jury unanimity is relaxed, all 
the vaunted protections of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will 
be threatened. Requiring jury unanimity as to the crime itself only, 
rather than each element of the crime would permit a jury to 
render inconsistent and potentially irrational verdicts because they 
may be based on conflicting and even inconsistent determinations 
of the facts. That is no small erosion of a fundamental principle 
of our criminal justice system. 
Id. at 578. 
B 
JURY IN UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT ON VIABLE THEORY 
OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that in a criminal case a general verdict of guilty cannot stand if the state's case was 
premised on more than one factual or legal theory of the elements of the crime and any 
one of these theories is flawed or lacks a requisite evidentiary foundation. In such 
circumstances, it is impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously agreed on all 
of the elements of a viable theory of the offense. 
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In the instant case, the district court itself concluded that there was "no 
conceivable way that the jury verdict could have relied upon the victimization of Bauers" 
(R 1238). Yet the state argued this theory of responsibility (R 1168) and we have no 
assurance that the verdict was not based upon such a theory. 
Furthermore, the state advanced the theory that ERA was a victim of the 
alleged forgery. Although the court concluded that this was not a viable theory (R1042, 
1046), the jury was never instructed that it could not base its verdict on a finding that 
defendant intended to defraud ERA (R 243, 1044-45, 1050). 
Inasmuch as it is impossible to determine which theory or theories the jury 
relied upon, if any one of the theories of fraud is not legally or factually viable, the 
defendant's conviction cannot stand. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT MADE ERRONEOUS 
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS. 
A 
"EXPERT OPINION" REGARDING STRENGTH OF 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTENT 
After the defendant had rested, the state proposed to call Hans Q. 
Chamberlain as an expert witness for the purpose of advising the jury that a person is 
not, by virtue of his licensure as an attorney, authorized to endorse another person's 
name on a negotiable instrument (R 1115-17). Defendant objected on the basis that 
Mr. Winward had never testified that the fact that he was an attorney authorized him 
to endorse the subject check (R 1117). Mr. Winward had testified that he had a 
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partnership or co-venture relationship with Nicole Packer and claimed implied authority 
based upon that relationship, not his licensure as an attorney (R 1089-90, 1110-12). 
Defendant therefore contended that the proffered testimony was not rebuttal (R 1120). 
The district court concluded that Mr. Chamberlain's expert opinions may assist the jury 
in understanding the evidence (R 1120-22). 
The prosecutor then had Mr. Chamberlain outline his qualifications which 
included service as president of the Utah State Bar, service as Iron County Attorney, 
service as president of the Statewide Association of Prosecutors, service as a member 
of the board of trustees for the Law and Justice Center, and service as a bar examiner 
for the Utah State Bar (R 1123-26). 
The prosecutor then asked Mr. Chamberlain on approximately how many 
occasions checks payable to third parties and representing funds that belong to other 
persons had come into Mr. Chamberlain's hands as the result of a real estate transaction 
(R 1127). Chamberlain estimated that in the course of his practice there had been 
approximately 50 such occasions. Chamberlain was then asked whether or not in his 
opinion he, as a lawyer, had authority to sign the third party's name on any of those 50 
occasions (R 1128). Chamberlain was then allowed to testify, over objection, that it 
would be improper for an attorney to sign a client's name to a check under such 
circumstances (R 1128-29). 
On cross-examination defense counsel sought to elicit Mr. Chamberlain's 
opinions regarding implied authority existing between partners or co-venturers (R 1131-
36) and further sought Mr. Chamberlain's concession that the evidence before the court 
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presented a jury question as to whether or not the defendant had acted with a purpose 
to defraud (R 1135-36, 1138-43). 
The state responded by posing a hypothetical question which the state 
believed outlined the evidence before the jury and then asking Mr. Chamberlain if he 
had an opinion as to whether or not such facts Vould show a purpose to defraud" (R 
1143). Following defense counsel's objection, the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: Counsel, your objection is noted. Overruled. Mr. 
Chamberlain, you may answer. 
THE WITNESS: Ask me the question again. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
that would, in your opinion, evidence a purpose to defraud? 
MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, the rules compel me to note 
my objection and the grounds for it. Irrelevant, immaterial and in 
violation of Rule 403. 
THE COURT: And I appreciate your specificity, Counsel. 
Weighing this matter, coupled with the Court's cautionary 
instruction, overruled. Mr. Chamberlain, do you have an opinion? 
THE WITNESS: I have an opinion. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) And that would be what, sir? 
A. My opinion, that that is strong evidence of intent to defraud. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you, sir. 
R1144. 
Defendant then moved for an immediate mistrial. That motion was 
overruled and denied (R 1146). 
The district court apparently concluded that Mr. Chamberlain's opinions 
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would "assist [the jury] to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue". See 
U.R.E. 702. Indeed, unless Chamberlain's opinion made it appear "more probable" that 
the defendant intended to defraud someone, the opinion would have had no relevance. 
See U.R.E. 401. The admission of this opinion clearly violated U.R.E. 702, 704(b), and 
403. 
Abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as 
to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be 
helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of 
evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample 
assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely 
tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of oath-
helpers of an earlier day. 
Advisory Committee Note, F.R.E. 704. 
A witness' statement which amounts to an expression of his belief as to 
how a case should be decided should be excluded for "to receive it would tend to 
suggest that the judge and jury may shift responsibility for decision to the witnesses." 
McCormick on Evidence at 30 (E. Cleary, 3d ed. 1984). Along the same line, in State 
v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court, in reversing the 
defendant's conviction based upon the erroneous and prejudicial admission of expert 
testimony regarding the credibility of witnesses, commented: "We remain wary of the 
potential of such evidence to distort the fact-finding process by reason of its superficial 
plausibility and its potential for inducing fact-finders to accept experts' judgments on 
critical issues rather than making their own." Id. at 399. 
In State v. Walters, 813 P.2d 857 (Idaho 1990), the defendant appealed 
an arson conviction based upon the fact that the state's arson investigator was allowed, 
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without objection, to state his opinion as to who started the fire. In reversing the 
conviction, the supreme court of Idaho noted: 
Clearly this testimony was inadmissible because of its obvious 
usurpation of the jury function, and its highly prejudicial effect 
upon the jury in reaching a verdict. We agree with Walters that 
the testimony constituted an unwarranted invasion into the 
province of the jury, and that Walters' constitutional right to a jury 
trial was thereby violated. 
Id. at 858-59. 
Most of the original opinion in Walter is devoted to a determination of 
whether or not "fundamental error" had been committed which required reversal 
notwithstanding the fact that defense counsel had not objected to the admission of the 
arson investigator's opinion. On rehearing, the state relied on Rule 704 of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence, which, like the Utah rule, is based upon the federal rules. 
In reviewing the application of Rule 704, the Idaho court stated: 
While experts may render a wide range of opinions based upon 
their special skills or knowledge, we are not prepared to go so far 
to hold that an expert may tender his opinion as to the ultimate 
fact in a criminal trial - the defendant's guilt or innocence of the 
crime charged. 
Id. at 866. 
In the instant case, Chamberlain's opinion was provided by way of 
"rebuttal" after the defendant had taken the stand and testified that he had endorsed 
the check. The central issue for the jury to determine was whether or not the defendant 
acted with a purpose to defraud. Allowing Chamberlain to testify that certain 
hypothetical facts constituted "strong evidence of intent to defraud" was prejudicial error. 
In substance and effect, the district court made Chamberlain a "ninth juror" who was 
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allowed to tell the other jurors how he, as an "expert", would weigh the evidence. 
Counsel has not been able to locate any case where a witness has been qualified as an 
expert in determining the strength of a circumstantial evidence case or in weighing 
evidence, direct or circumstantial. 
Even if, in an appropriate context, such an opinion were admissible, 
Chamberlain demonstrated no particular expertise in weighing evidence and, 
furthermore, the hypothetical question was inadequate in that it failed to include 
exculpatory facts and circumstances which the prosecution would have had to 
concede.14 The opinion offered in response to the hypothetical question as framed was 
irrelevant. 
Defendant concedes that a trial court is granted broad discretion in its 
decision to admit or exclude evidence. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 
1994). However, litigants have the right to expect that, notwithstanding the fact that a 
measure of discretion is vested in the trial court, the well-established rules of evidence 
will govern the boundaries of the contest. As Justice King noted in Fenstermaker v. 
Tribune Publishing Co., 12 Utah 439, 43 P. 112 (1895): 
While, perhaps, the same results might be reached by the court or 
jury if improper evidence were admitted, or proper evidence 
14Here is the hypothetical question: 
Q. Taking all of those assumptions that you can recall and add to that, now, Mr. 
Chamberlain, that the partner whose name was signed did not give authority and add the 
assumption that the partner whose name was signed didn't even know about the check and 
add that to the assumption that these partners agreed to a one-third split and the partner 
whose name was signed had no idea of the amount of that check, do you have an opinion as 
to whether or not that that would show purpose to defraud? 
R 1143. 
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excluded, still a strict adherence to well-established rules of 
evidence is essential, or our courts and systems of jurisprudence 
will be regarded as delusions and snares. fThe rules of evidence 
are founded in the charities of religion, in the philosophy of 
nature, in the truths of history, and in the experience of human 
life.11 And any departure from them can only be attended by evils 
immeasurable in their consequences. 
12 Utah at 472. 
In denying defendant's application for certificate of probable cause, the 
district court made the following comment: 
If there was any error in the receipt of any of Mr. Chamberlain's 
testimony in view of the clear weight of the evidence that the jury 
relied upon, I think any error there would have been harmless 
error. 
R 1276. 
As demonstrated in Point II, supra, the state's evidence was far from 
compelling and certainly not strong enough to carry the additional burden of this 
substantial error. 
B 
"OTHER WRONGS" 
The district court erred in admitting evidence of prejudicial material the 
relevance of which was based entirely upon the theory that Bassetts, Bauers, and ERA 
were victimized by the alleged forgery. To the extent that criminal responsibility for the 
alleged forgery cannot be based upon these alleged "wrongs", the admission of such 
evidence was irrelevant and served only to prejudice the defendant. 
The district court allowed the state to present evidence suggesting that the 
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defendant and his wife had allegedly committed wrongs against Bauers and ERA Realty 
Center on the assumption that the state would ultimately be able to establish that frauds 
had in fact been perpetrated against Bauers and ERA and that these frauds had been 
facilitated by the alleged forgery. All of this prejudicial material turned out to have no 
or little relevance once the court concluded that Bauers and ERA were not potential 
victims of the alleged forgery. 
Even if this evidence had some marginal relevance, the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury clearly outweighed its 
relevance. See U.R.E. 403. Unfortunately, the district court did not begin to sustain 
objections on this basis until after it had become painfully obvious that the state would 
not be able to demonstrate that this defendant was guilty of an actionable fraud against 
Bauers or ERA (R 1100).15 
The potential for confusion of the issues and misleading the jury was 
further compounded by the fact the district court never struck the evidence of the 
alleged wrongdoings against Bauers and ERA and failed to instruct the jury that they 
could not base their verdict upon either of these theories of fraud. The prejudice to the 
defendant in the admission of this material is clearly demonstrated. The task of 
separating the wheat from the chaff was one which the district court and the state's 
prosecutor never attempted. Leaving the undertaking to the jury was to invite prejudice 
and confusion. 
The introduction of this prejudicial evidence is but another consequence of the district court's refusal 
to require the state to limit its evidence to the theory of liability outlined in its bill of particulars. 
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POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY. 
A 
CREATION OF JOINT VENTURE AND IMPLIED AUTHORITY 
The defendant proposed the following jury instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: You are instructed that a joint venture 
is an association of persons organized for the purpose of engaging 
in and carrying out a single business venture. A joint venture may 
be created without any particular formality or writing and may be 
inferred by the conduct of the parties. 
R228. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5: Each member of a joint venture stands 
in relationship of agent as well as principal to the other members 
of the venture in matters relating to the object for which the joint 
venture was formed. 
R 227. 
These purposed instructions stated fundamental principles of law. They 
were based on the text of 46 Am.Jur.2d, Joint Ventures §§1, 42. In refusing the 
instructions, the district court said: 
Instruction No. 4 and 5 on joint venture, I find that while you may 
argue joint venture and have presented sufficient evidence to argue 
joint venture, that it is inappropriate for the court to instruct on 
that matter because I'm not sure that the facts and the evidence 
before the court at this juncture support instructions on joint 
venture. 
R 1155. 
Each party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the applicable law in 
a clear and understandable way. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981). In State v. 
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Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court held: 
We are not concerned with the reasonableness, nor the credibility 
of the defendant's evidence relating to his claim of self defense. 
Each party is, however, entitled to have the jury instructed on the 
law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any reasonable 
basis in the evidence to justify it. 
The district court's refusal to instruct the jury on what was necessary to 
the creation of a joint venture was particularly harmful given the fact that the court had 
refused to allow defense counsel to use the term "joint venture" in questioning Ms. 
Packer because she said she was not certain she knew what a joint venture was. 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] You were in a joint venture 
agreement with him, is that correct? 
A. [BY THE WITNESS] IVe never called it a joint venture 
agreement. I didn't think of it in those terms. I don't know — 
what are the implications or the repercussions of being in a joint 
venture with someone or is that just a fancy term that you're 
using? 
Q. Wel l -
A. Are there any implications? 
Q. Let me try to say it in terms that are more familiar to you. 
A- Thank you. 
Q. You were in an agreement — you were participating in a 
business transaction with the Winwards, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And under that transaction, you were dividing duties? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were talking about sharing profits from that 
transaction? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And, for the sake of clarity, I - let me refer that to a 
joint venture agreement, okay? 
MR. BURNS: I'm going to object to that, Your Honor, because 
she doesn't understand the term and I don't know that there's -
assumes facts not in evidence. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You can refer to it as an enterprise, Counsel. 
R 996-97. 
Consequently, "joint venture" was never defined in the context of the 
evidence or the instructions. The court's concession that counsel could argue joint 
venture was meaningless under such circumstances. The jurors look to the court, not 
counsel, to instruct them on the law. 
Refusal to give the proposed instructions was prejudicial error. The 
evidence supported instructions on the law of joint venture and implied authority and 
these issues were central to the defendant's theory of the case. 
B 
SPECIFIC INTENT 
The district court instructed the jury that in order to find the defendant 
guilty, the jury must find that the defendant acted "knowingly and intentionally" and that 
he acted ftwith a purpose to defraud" or "knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud" (R 
43). The court gave two instructions defining "intentionally" in terms of general criminal 
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intent (R 242, 244) and defined "purpose to defraud" as "simply a purpose to use a false 
writing as if it were genuine in order to gain some advantage" (R 240). 
The defendant requested a specific intent instruction (R 229) which was 
based on the patterned specific intent instruction promulgated by the Federal Bar 
Association, Utah Chapter (R 221, 224). The district court refused to give the 
instruction (R 1151-52). 
While the court was careful to instruct the jury on general criminal intent, 
its instruction defining "purpose to defraud" failed to acquaint the jury with the concept 
of specific intent. In State v. Potter, supra, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction because the jury instructions "failed to explain adequately the 
distinction between general and specific intent requirements or relate those 
requirements to the facts of the case " 627 P.2d at 78. Justice Stewart in concurring 
in the reversal of the conviction stated: 
Although the instructions used the term "specific intent," they did 
not define that term. However meaningful that term of art may be 
to lawyers, it clearly fails to convey the intended legal meaning to 
jurors unless it is carefully and precisely defined. Absent such a 
definition, the jury could not possibly find all of the necessary 
elements of the crime, especially in view of the defense relied upon 
in this case. 
Id. at 81. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the instructions given in the instant 
case could not have possibly acquainted the jury with the concept of specific intent. 
Indeed, the district court's definition of "purpose to defraud" muffled the specific intent 
element of this offense to the point where it could not be heard above the roar of the 
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instructions defining the concept of general criminal intent. 
Where an offense by its very definition requires specific intent, that intent 
is as much an element of the offense as the act itself. The absence of such a specific 
intent was the sum and substance of the defense in this case. The district court's 
definition of "purpose to defraud" coupled with its refusal to define specific intent, 
effectively eliminated this element of the offense. The jury instructions failed to provide 
the proper legal framework against which the defense could be meaningfully presented. 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR. 
After the preliminary hearing defendant moved to have Scott M. Burns 
disqualified as the state's prosecutor in this matter and requested an evidentiary hearing. 
The defendant alleged that Mr. Burns had perjured himself in the statement of probable 
cause which he signed in order to obtain warrants for the arrest of the defendant and 
his wife and that, during the noon recess of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Burns accosted 
defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and invited defense counsel to step 
outside, apparently for the purpose of some physical altercation (R 88-90). Defendant 
also alleged that Mr. Burns's conduct of the prosecution of this matter evidenced an 
irrational and unjustifiable animus toward the defendant and defendant's wife. 
ihe district court actually facilitated the state's theory of criminal responsibility by instructing the jury 
that a "purpose to defiraud" is "simply" the use of a false document "to gain some advantage". This instruction 
dispensed with the necessity of proving inducement and reliance. For discussion of this issue, See Point 11(B), 
supra. 
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Defendant specifically requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion (R 131-32). The 
district court refused to afford defendant an evidentiary hearing and denied defendant's 
motion (R 189-90). 
Throughout the trial, the prosecutor continually struck foul blows. 
Although the prosecutor clearly understood that the contract price in the Packer/Bassett 
transaction was $58,000 which was to be paid by a down payment in the amount of 
$3,000 and the execution of a trust deed note in the amount of $55,000, the prosecutor 
continually attempted to introduce confusion on this issue (R 767, 812, 904-05,1107-08). 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor had asked the court to bind the 
defendant over on a theory that he had cheated Patricia Williams out of $3,000 (R 638-
39). Although the court had refused to bind the defendant over for trial on such a 
theory (R 645-46), this did not prevent the prosecutor from presenting this theory as yet 
another fraud that was somehow facilitated by the alleged forgery. 
Q. [BY MR. BURNS] Isn't it true, Mr. Winward, that the note 
was for $55,000.00? 
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] That's true. 
Q. And isn't it true that Patricia Williams knew the note was for 
$55,000.00? 
A. That's true. 
Q. And isn't it true that Patricia Williams had no knowledge that 
Vicki Bassett was paying $58,000.00? 
A. She wasn't buying the down payment, she was buying the note. 
Q. Okay. But my question is, did Pat Williams have any idea that 
Vicki Bassett was going to pay $58,000.00? 
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MR PENDLETON: Objection. Irrelevant and immaterial. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR BURNS: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Pat Williams - our negotiations with Pat 
Williams were completely about a promissory note. We had no 
discussions about a down payment, so, no, she didn't know what 
the down payment was. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) In fact, you were at the preliminary hearing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where she said she was surprised, that was the first time she'd 
ever heard the figure $58,000.00? 
A. She probably would be because she wasn't buying a down 
payment. She was buying a $55,000.00 note. 
R 1107-08. 
The prosecutor also attempted to develop a theory that the defendant had 
defrauded ERA Realty Center out of a commission earned in connection with the 
Packer/Bassett transaction (R 808-09, 861-64). The prosecutor persisted in pursing this 
theory of wrongdoing before the jury even after the district court had concluded that the 
theory had no validity (R 1042, 1045-46, 1099-1100). 
A thorough review of the transcript will demonstrate that these are but 
a few of the unfair tactics which the state employed throughout the trial. This case was 
not about justice or even retribution, it was about the prosecutor's vindictiveness. 
In State v. Marcotte. 229 La. 539, 86 So.2d 186 (1956), the defendant 
moved for the recusal of the district attorney on the ground that the latter had a 
personal animosity against him due, inter alia, to long-standing political differences 
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between them and previous difficulty between the defendant and the district attorney's 
father. The court noted that the policy requiring recusal was equally applicable to cases 
where the district attorney had a personal interest in convicting the accused as it was to 
cases where he had a personal interest in having him acquitted since the state seeks only 
equal and impartial justice. The court held that it was error for the trial court to refuse 
to hear evidence in support of the defendant's motion. 
Unless this court is prepared to conclude that the misconduct which was 
alleged in the instant case does not disqualify the prosecutor, the court must conclude 
that the district court erred in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The district 
court denied defendant's motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing to test the 
truthfulness of the allegations. Such a course of action would be appropriate only if the 
motion could be properly denied notwithstanding the truth of the allegations of 
misconduct. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the alleged conduct in fact disqualifies 
the prosecutor and that the district court erred in refusing to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing and in denying the motion. 
POINT VII 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN PROHIBITING 
DEFENDANT FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW. 
By provision of Article VIII, Section 4, Utah Constitution, the Utah 
Supreme Court is vested with the exclusive power to make rules which "govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of 
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persons admitted to practice law." 
The Utah Supreme Court has exercised that power by adopting the Rules 
of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. These rules identify the officials who are 
empowered to investigate, screen, and prosecute complaints involving ethical violations. 
They further identify the procedures to be followed in investigating and screening 
complaints, in trying meritorious complaints, and in conducting aggravation/mitigation 
hearings. Rule 1(c), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, states: "All disciplinary 
proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the rules and proceedings described 
herein." 
The district courts of this state are not vested with the authority to 
formulate their own procedures for the discipline of members of the practicing bar. 
Even in the context of imposing discipline for the conviction of a crime, the trial court 
is without authority to summarily suspend an attorney on its own initiative. Indeed, Rule 
19, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, governs interim suspension resulting from 
criminal conviction. The rule does not authorize the district court to make such a 
suspension on its own initiative. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the defendant's 
conviction should be reversed and the matter dismissed based upon the state's failure 
to make a prima facie case. Alternatively, in the event the court shall determine that 
the state in fact made a prima facie case, the conviction should nevertheless be reversed 
and the matter remanded for new trial. Finally, if the conviction is affirmed, the order 
49 
of probation should be modified to the extent that it prohibits the practice of law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 day March, 1995. 
.JsL 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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Assistant Utah Attorney General at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
ML 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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ADDENDUM 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court - Judges pro 
tempore - Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence 
to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage 
the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. 
Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and 
judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro 
tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, 
and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule 
shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice 
law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
practice law. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
76-6-501. Forgery - "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud 
to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or 
utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing 
or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or 
any other method of recording information, checks, tokens, 
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any 
other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing 
is or purports to be: 
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or 
writing issued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of 
stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an 
interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in 
or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing 
is or purports to be a check with a face amount of less than 
$100; all other forgery is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the 
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided 
by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental 
state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an 
opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not 
have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the 
crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are 
matters for the trier of fact alone. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
